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Abstract
For a safe and reliable operation of the smart grid, timely detection of cyber-attacks is of critical importance. Moreover,
considering smarter and more capable attackers, robust detection mechanisms are needed against a diverse range of cyber-attacks.
With these purposes, we propose a robust online detection algorithm for (possibly combined) false data injection (FDI) and
jamming attacks, that also provides online estimates of the unknown and time-varying attack parameters and recovered state
estimates. Further, considering smarter attackers that are capable of designing stealthy attacks to prevent the detection or to
increase the detection delay of the proposed algorithm, we propose additional countermeasures. Numerical studies illustrate the
quick and reliable response of the proposed detection mechanisms against hybrid and stealthy cyber-attacks.
Index Terms
Smart grid, Kalman filter, quickest detection, cumulative sum (CUSUM), online estimation, state recovery, false data injection
attack, jamming attack, hybrid attack, stealthy attack, Shewhart test, chi-squared test.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. A Brief Overview of Cyber-Attacks and Countermeasures in Smart Grid
Due to the integration of advanced signal processing, communication, and control technologies, smart grid relies on a
critical cyber infrastructure that is subject to adversarial cyber threats [1]–[4]. The smart grid is regulated based on estimated
system states and the main aim of attackers is to damage/mislead the state estimation mechanism and thereby to cause
wrong/manipulated decisions in the energy management system of the smart grid. Some potential consequences of a successful
cyber-attack are regional power blackouts, manipulated electricity market prices [5], [6], and destabilization of the power grid
[7]. Such cyber-attacks are also seen in practice. For instance, on December 23, 2015, the Ukrainian power system was attacked
and the resulting power blackout affected around 200,000 people for several hours [8].
The Ukraine attack has demonstrated that attackers have more capabilities than predicted [8]. Namely, (i) attackers can access
and monitor the power system over long periods of time without being detected, (ii) attackers are able to perform cyber-attacks
by hacking smart grid components (smart meters, control centers, etc.), manipulating/jamming the network communication
channels, and accessing and manipulating the database of the control center [2], [8], [9]. Hence, cyber-attacks significantly
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2threaten the safe and reliable operation of the power grid in practice. Effective countermeasures need to be developed considering
the worst-case scenarios where the attackers are fully capable of performing a diverse range of cyber-attacks. The first step in
a defense mechanism is early detection of cyber-attacks. After detecting an attack, effective mitigation schemes should then
be implemented.
Recently, the false data injection (FDI) attacks [2], [10]–[12] and the jamming attacks [9], [13]–[15] against the smart grid
are extensively studied in the literature and several detectors are proposed. The proposed detectors are mostly outlier detectors,
i.e., they classify a sample measurement as either normal or anomalous. Conventional detectors classify a measurement as
anomalous if the measurement residual exceeds a certain threshold [10], [16]–[19]. More advanced machine learning techniques
are also considered for classification of anomalous measurements [20], [21]. Moreover, in [12], firstly a Markov graph model
for system states is learned under normal system operation and then attacks/anomalies are detected based on the consistency
of new measurements compared to the learned nominal model. Further, in [22], based on the least squares (LS) state estimator,
a multi-step procedure is presented to detect and classify cyber-attacks on meter measurements, network line parameters, and
network topology, and then to make corrections for attack mitigation.
In [23]–[25], robust extended Kalman filters have been proposed where the main aim is to bound the effects of outliers
on the state estimation mechanism. No specific attack types are considered so that using such schemes, it is not possible to
distinguish a real attack from random outliers, e.g., due to heavy-tailed non-Gaussian noise processes. Moreover, such schemes
have breakdown points such that if outliers, significantly far away from the nominal measurements, are observed, then the
proposed filters fail to keep track of the system state.
In order to improve the time resolution and also to detect cyber-attacks more reliably, several online detectors based on the
quickest detection theory are proposed. For instance, in [26] and [27], cumulative sum (CUSUM)-based schemes are considered
to detect FDI attacks where the state estimation is based on the conventional LS methods. More recently, in [28], CUSUM-based
detection schemes are proposed to detect FDI and denial of service (DoS) attacks (separately) in a dynamic setting and their
advantages over the outlier detectors and the LS-based detectors are demonstrated. Further, in [29], a nonparametric CUSUM
detector is proposed that do not assume any attack model and only evaluates the deviation of meter measurements from the
baseline statistics, i.e., normal system operation. In [30], a window-based CUSUM detector is proposed for detection of FDI
attacks where the attack parameters of interest are estimated based on the most recent sliding window of measurements.
B. Contributions
In this paper, we propose robust mechanisms for timely detection of potentially combined and stealthily designed FDI and
jamming attacks. The proposed mechanisms are tightly connected to an estimation mechanism, which makes both the detection
and state estimation schemes robust against unknown and time-varying attack variables. In particular, online maximum likelihood
estimates (MLEs) of the attack types, set of attacked meters, and the attack magnitudes are used in attack detection. Moreover,
recovered state estimates are computed based on the online MLE estimates of the attack variables. No restrictive assumptions
are made about an attacker’s strategy, i.e., an attacker can design and perform arbitrarily combined FDI and jamming attacks,
targeting any subset of meters in any magnitude and can also change its attack parameters over time. Further, considering the
3possibility of smarter and more capable attackers, additional countermeasures are proposed against stealthily designed cyber-
attacks. These make the proposed detection schemes highly robust against a significantly wide range of potential cyber-attacks
targeting the smart grid.
Since the smart grid is a highly complex network, any anomaly/failure in a part of the system can quickly spread over
the network and lead to new unpredicted failures. Hence, timely attack detection and mitigation is crucial. In this paper, for
timely detection, we present real-time detection mechanisms. Moreover, to help for timely attack mitigation and quick system
recovery, we provide online estimates of the attack types, set of attacked meters and attack magnitudes. Note that having an
estimate for the attack type can be useful since different countermeasures may need to be employed against different types of
attacks. Further, considering that the real power grid is a huge network consisting of many meters, an estimate of the attacked
meters can be critical for a timely and effective attack mitigation, e.g., via isolating the attacked meters during the recovery
procedure. Moreover, estimates of attack magnitudes are needed to recover attack-free states.
We list our main contributions as follows:
• A novel low-complexity online detection and estimation algorithm is proposed against (possibly) combined FDI and
jamming attacks. The proposed algorithm is robust to unknown and time-varying attack types, magnitudes, and set of
attacked meters. Further, recovered state estimates and closed-form online MLE estimates of the attack variables are
presented.
• Stealthy attacks against CUSUM-based detectors and particularly against the proposed algorithm are introduced and
analyzed.
• Several countermeasures are proposed against the considered stealthy attacks.
C. Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, the system model, attack models, state estimation mechanism,
and the problem formulation are presented. In Sec. III, an online cyber-attack detection and estimation algorithm is presented.
In Sec. IV, stealthy attacks against CUSUM-based detectors are introduced and analyzed. Also, countermeasures against the
considered stealthy attacks are presented. In Sec. V, the proposed detection schemes are evaluated extensively via simulations.
Finally, the paper is concluded in Sec. VI. Boldface letters denote vectors and matrices, and all vectors are column vectors.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
The actual power grid is regulated based on a nonlinear AC power flow model [2]. On the other hand, the approximate
linearized (around an operating point) DC power flow model is a good approximation that is widely used in the literature
to describe the operation of the power grid [10], [16], [31]. Furthermore, static system model and consequently conventional
static (LS) state estimation are not effective in capturing the dynamics of a power system due to time-varying load and power
generation [11]. In addition, attack detection mechanisms based on static estimators are not effective in detecting time-varying
4cyber-attacks and structured “stealth” FDI attacks [10], for which dynamic state estimator-based detectors are known to be
effective [28], [32].
We then model the power grid, consisting of N + 1 buses and K meters, as a discrete-time linear dynamic system based
on the commonly employed linear DC model [10], [16], [31] as follows:
xt = Axt−1 + vt, (1)
yt = Hxt +wt, (2)
where xt = [x1,t, x2,t, . . . , xN,t]T is the state vector denoting the phase angles of N buses (one of the buses is considered
as a reference bus), A ∈ RN×N is the state transition matrix, vt = [v1,t, v2,t, . . . , vN,t]T ∼ N (0, σ2v IN ) is the process noise
vector, IN is an N ×N identity matrix, and ·T is the transpose operator. Further, yt = [yT1,t,yT2,t, . . . ,yTK,t]T is the vector
consisting of meter measurements, yk,t = [yk,t,1, yk,t,2, . . . , yk,t,λ]T is the measurement vector for meter k, H ∈ RKλ×N
is the measurement matrix, wt = [wT1,t,w
T
2,t, . . . ,w
T
K,t]
T ∼ N (0, σ2w IKλ) is the measurement noise vector, and wk,t =
[wk,t,1, wk,t,2, . . . , wk,t,λ]
T is the measurement noise vector for meter k. Note that in each time interval between t− 1 and t,
λ ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . } measurements are taken at each meter, where λ is usually small, and the collected measurements between
t− 1 and t are processed at time t. To increase the measurement redundancy against noise and also to estimate the unknown
attack parameters more reliably in case of a cyber-attack, λ needs to be chosen higher.
In general, the state transition and measurement matrices can also be dynamic. For instance, due to changes in network
topology, i.e., on and off states of the switches and line breakers in the power grid, the measurement matrix may vary over
time. In that case, instead of modeling the smart grid as a linear time-invariant system as in (1) and (2), we can model it as
a linear time-varying system where we can replace A and H by At and Ht, respectively. The results presented in this study
can be generalized to the case of linear time-varying system model as long as At and Ht are known by the system controller
at each time t.
B. Attack Models
We assume that at an unknown time τ , a cyber-attack is launched to the system, where we particularly consider FDI attacks,
jamming attacks, and their combination. The attack types, attack magnitudes, and the set of attacked meters can be time-varying.
But, during a time interval, i.e., between t − 1 and t, we assume that the attack parameters stay constant. Next, we explain
the attack models under consideration.
1) FDI Attack: In case of an FDI attack, additive malicious data are injected into the measurements of a subset of meters.
In practice, an FDI attack can be performed by manipulating the network communication channels or hacking meters and/or
control centers in the smart grid [2], [8]. The measurement model in case of an FDI attack takes the following form:
yt = Hxt + at +wt, t ≥ τ, (3)
where at = [aT1,t,a
T
2,t, . . . ,a
T
K,t]
T denotes the injected false data at time t. Since the attack magnitudes are assumed to be
constant between t− 1 and t, for meter k, ak,t = 1λ×1 ak,t, where 1λ×1 is a λ× 1 vector consisting of 1s. Note that if meter
5k is not under an FDI attack at time t, then ak,t = 0, otherwise ak,t 6= 0.
2) Jamming Attack: In case of a jamming attack, we assume that the attacker constantly emits additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) to the network communication channels to compromise a subset of meter measurements. We consider jamming
with AWGN since (i) it is a commonly employed jamming model in the literature [33], [34], (ii) it is a simple attacking
strategy to perform, and (iii) in an additive noise channel with Gaussian input, for a given mean and variance, among all
noise distributions, the Gaussian noise maximizes the mean squared error of estimating the channel input given the channel
output [34], [35]. Hence, an attacker can jam the communication channels with AWGN to maximize its damage on the state
estimation mechanism.
In case of a jamming attack, the measurement model can be written as follows:
yt = Hxt +wt + nt, t ≥ τ, (4)
where nt = [nT1,t,n
T
2,t, . . . ,n
T
K,t]
T ∼ N (0,diag(σt)) denotes the jamming noise, σt = [σT1,t,σT2,t, . . . ,σTK,t]T, and σk,t =
1λ×1 σ2k,t where σ
2
k,t is the variance of the jamming noise targeting meter k at time t. If meter k is not under a jamming
attack at time t, then σ2k,t = 0, otherwise σ
2
k,t > 0.
3) Hybrid Attack: In case of a hybrid (combined) attack, FDI and jamming attacks are simultaneously launched to the
system and hence the measurement model takes the following form:
yt = Hxt + at +wt + nt, t ≥ τ. (5)
For meter k under both FDI and jamming attacks at time t, ak,t 6= 0 and σ2k,t > 0. Since the FDI and jamming attacks can be
considered as special cases of hybrid attacks, we consider (5) as the measurement model under the attacking regime, i.e., for
t ≥ τ .
Remark 1: If the noise terms in the normal system operation are AWGN (as in (1) and (2)) and the jamming noise terms
are mutually independent over the meters, then the considered hybrid FDI/jamming attacks span all possible data attacks. This
is due to the fact that a Gaussian random variable is defined by its mean and variance, and through the hybrid attacks, mean
and variance of the density of meter measurements can be arbitrarily changed (cf. (5)). For instance, in case of a DoS attack,
meter measurements are blocked and only a random or zero signal is received at the control center [9], [13], [14]. Hence, the
DoS attack can be considered as a special case of the hybrid cyber-attacks, i.e., a DoS attack can either be equivalent to an
FDI attack with false data being in the same magnitude of the actual signal but with an opposite sign or a jamming attack with
high level noise variances such that the actual signal can be neglected compared to the noise signal [28]. On the other hand,
if the jamming noise is correlated over the meters or it is not normally distributed, then such an attack does not comply with
the considered jamming attack model in (4) and nor with (5). For such cases, we consider a non-parametric goodness-of-fit
test as a countermeasure (see Sec. IV-C.2).
6C. Pre- and Post-Attack Measurement Densities
Let H = [HT1 ,H
T
2 , . . . ,H
T
K ]
T where Hk ∈ Rλ×N is the measurement matrix for meter k. Since the measurement matrix
is determined based on the system topology, the rows of Hk are identical, i.e., Hk = 1λ×1 hTk , where h
T
k is a row of Hk.
Based on the considered post-attack model in (5), a measurement obtained at meter k during the time interval between t− 1
and t, i.e., yk,t,i, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , λ} can be written as
yk,t,i =

hTk xt + wk,t,i, if k ∈ S0t
hTk xt + ak,t + wk,t,i, if k ∈ Sft
hTk xt + wk,t,i + nk,t,i, if k ∈ Sjt
hTk xt + ak,t + wk,t,i + nk,t,i, if k ∈ Sf,jt
, t ≥ τ, (6)
where S0t is the set of non-attacked meters, Sft is the set of meters under only FDI attack, Sjt is the set of meters under only
jamming attack, and Sf,jt is the set of meters under both FDI and jamming attacks at time t ≥ τ . Note that S0t , Sft , Sjt , and
Sf,jt are disjoint sets and S0t ∪ Sft ∪ Sjt ∪ Sf,jt = {1, 2, . . . ,K}.
Then, the probability density functions (pdfs) of the measurements in the pre- and post-attack regimes take respectively the
following forms ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , λ}:
yk,t,i ∼ N (hTk xt, σ2w), ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}, t < τ, (7)
and
yk,t,i ∼

N (hTk xt, σ2w), ∀k ∈ S0t
N (hTk xt + ak,t, σ2w), ∀k ∈ Sft
N (hTk xt, σ2w + σ2k,t), ∀k ∈ Sjt
N (hTk xt + ak,t, σ2w + σ2k,t), ∀k ∈ Sf,jt
, t ≥ τ. (8)
D. State Estimation
Since the smart grid is modeled as a discrete-time linear dynamic system with the Gaussian noise terms (cf. (1) and (2)),
the Kalman filter is the optimal linear estimator in minimizing the mean squared state estimation error [36]. Further, since
the measurement models for the pre- and post-attack periods are different (cf. (7) and (8)), two Kalman filters need to be
simultaneously employed: one for assuming no attack occurs at all and one for assuming an attack occurs at an unknown time
τ . Since the latter involves the unknown change-point τ and the unknown attack parameters at and σt, estimates of these
unknowns are needed to employ the corresponding Kalman filter. As we will explain later, τ is estimated by the detection
algorithm, at and σt are estimated via the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation.
The Kalman filter is an iterative real-time estimator composed of prediction and measurement update steps at each iteration.
Let the Kalman filter estimates for the pre- and post-attack cases be denoted with xˆ0t|t′ and xˆ
1
t|t′ , respectively where t
′ = t− 1
7and t′ = t for the prediction and measurement update steps at time t, respectively. The Kalman filter equations at time t are
then given as follows:
Pre-attack – Prediction:
xˆ0t|t−1 = Axˆ
0
t−1|t−1,
P0t|t−1 = AP
0
t−1|t−1A
T + σ2v IN , (9)
Pre-attack – Measurement update:
G0t = P
0
t|t−1H
T(HP0t|t−1H
T + σ2w IKλ)
−1,
xˆ0t|t = xˆ
0
t|t−1 +G
0
t (yt −Hxˆ0t|t−1),
P0t|t = P
0
t|t−1 −G0tHP0t|t−1, (10)
Post-attack – Prediction:
xˆ1t|t−1 = Axˆ
1
t−1|t−1,
P1t|t−1 = AP
1
t−1|t−1A
T + σ2v IN , (11)
Post-attack – Measurement update:
G1t = P
1
t|t−1H
T(HP1t|t−1H
T + σ2w IKλ + diag(σˆt))
−1,
xˆ1t|t = xˆ
1
t|t−1 +G
1
t (yt −Hxˆ1t|t−1 − aˆt),
P1t|t = P
1
t|t−1 −G1tHP1t|t−1, (12)
where P0t|t′ and P
1
t|t′ denote the estimates of the state covariance matrix at time t, and G
0
t and G
1
t denote the Kalman gain
matrices at time t for the pre- and post-attack cases, respectively. Note that the MLE estimates of the attack parameters are
used in the measurement update step of the Kalman filter for the post-attack case, where aˆt is the MLE of at (cf. (26)) and
σˆt is the MLE of σt (cf. (27)). Hence, xˆ1t|t−1 and xˆ
1
t|t are, in fact, recovered state estimates in case of a cyber-attack. Note,
however, that ML estimation errors may lead to errors in computing the recovered state estimates.
E. Problem Formulation
Our objective is detecting cyber-attacks in a timely and reliable manner and the quickest detection theory [37]–[39] is well
suited to this objective. In the quickest change detection problems, measurements become available sequentially over time
and at each time, either a change is declared or further measurements are taken in the next time interval, where the aim is
to optimally balance the detection delay and the false alarm rate. There are two main approaches in the quickest detection
theory, namely Bayesian and non-Bayesian. In a Bayesian setting, the change point τ is considered as a random variable with
a known a priori distribution whereas in a non-Bayesian setting, the change point is considered as non-random and unknown.
Our problem better fits to the non-Bayesian setting since we do not assume any a priori knowledge about the change-point τ .
8Then, we consider the following objective function, proposed by Lorden [40]:
d(T ) = sup
τ
ess sup
Fτ
Eτ
[
(T − τ)+ |Fτ
]
, (13)
where T is the stopping time at which an attack is declared, Fτ denotes all measurements obtained up to time τ , and Ej is
the expectation under Pj , that is the probability measure if the change occurs at time j. Note that d(T ) is called the worst-
case average detection delay since it is maximized over the change point and also over all measurements obtained up to the
change-point. We then consider the following minimax optimization problem:
inf
T
d(T ) subject to E∞[T ] ≥ α, (14)
where E∞[T ] is called the average false alarm period, i.e., average stopping time when no change occurs at all (τ =∞), and
α is a prespecified lower bound for E∞[T ].
Let the pre- and post-attack measurement pdfs given in (7) and (8) be denoted with p0(yt|xt) and p1(yt|xt,at,σt),
respectively. Since the dynamic system state xt is not directly observed and the attack parameters at and σt are completely
determined by an attacker and hence unknown, both pdfs are unknown and time-varying. If the pre- and post-attack pdfs
would be exactly known, then the well-known CUSUM algorithm would be the optimal solution to (14) [41]. Nonetheless, the
system state can be inferred using the Kalman filters and the MLEs of the unknown attack parameters can be computed. Then,
following a generalized likelihood ratio approach [38, Sec. 5.3], [26], [28] and replacing the unknowns with their estimates, a
generalized CUSUM algorithm can be used as a solution to (14).
In this paper, in addition to early attack detection, we also aim to recover the attack-free system states. Notice that in case
of no attack, i.e., for t < τ , the Kalman filter for the pre-attack case (assuming no attack at all) is the optimal state estimator.
However, after an attack occurs, the measurement model assumed in the pre-attack period (cf. (2)) is no longer true. Hence, the
state estimates for the pre-attack case, i.e., xˆ0t|t−1 and xˆ
0
t|t, deviate from the actual system state xt for t ≥ τ . Recalling that an
attack occurs at an unknown time τ and the measurements follow the post-attack measurement model (cf. (5)) for t ≥ τ , if the
attack launch time τ and the attack magnitudes at and σt would be exactly known, then the system state would be perfectly
recovered for t ≥ τ . Nonetheless, as we will explain more clearly in the next section, the (generalized) CUSUM algorithm
always keeps a change-point estimate τˆ in its memory and updates this estimate as the measurements become sequentially
available over time [38, Sec. 2.2]. When an attack is declared at the stopping time T , τˆ becomes the final change-point estimate
of the (generalized) CUSUM algorithm. Furthermore, the MLEs of the attack magnitudes, i.e., aˆt and σˆt, can be computed at
each time t. Then, employing a Kalman filter for the post-attack case (cf. (11) and (12)) and computing the state estimates
using the MLEs of the attack parameters in the measurement update step, recovered state estimates, i.e., xˆ1t|t−1 and xˆ
1
t|t, can
be obtained for τˆ ≤ t ≤ T .
III. ONLINE ATTACK DETECTION AND ESTIMATION
Since it is hard to distinguish noise from FDI/jamming attacks with small magnitudes, some minimum levels for the attack
magnitudes need to be defined in order to control the false alarm level of a detection algorithm. We then define the change
9event of interest as follows:
|ak,t| ≥ γ, ∀k ∈ Sft , t ≥ τ,
σ2k,t ≥ σ2, ∀k ∈ Sjt , t ≥ τ,
|ak,t| ≥ γ & σ2k,t ≥ σ2, ∀k ∈ Sf,jt , t ≥ τ, (15)
where γ and σ2 are the smallest attack magnitudes of interest for |ak,t| and σ2k,t, respectively. Note that, in general, an attacker
can arbitrarily choose its attack parameters, i.e., γ and σ2 do not restrict an attacker’s strategy. In fact, attackers usually do
not know such parameters. On the other hand, smarter attackers may exploit such lower bounds on the attack magnitudes in
order to perform stealthy attacks with small attack magnitudes (see Sec. IV-B).
The generalized CUSUM algorithm can then be written as follows:
T = inf
{
m ∈ N : max
1≤j≤m
m∑
t=j
sup
S0t ,Sft ,Sjt ,Sf,jt
log
sup|ak,t|≥γ, k∈Sft ∪Sf,jt supσ2k,t≥σ2, k∈Sjt ∪Sf,jt p1(yt | xˆ
1
t ,at,σt)
p0(yt|xˆ0t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
βt︸ ︷︷ ︸
gm
≥ h
}
,
(16)
where xˆ0t and xˆ
1
t denote the state estimates for the pre- and post-attack cases, respectively, gm is the decision statistic at
time m, h is the test threshold, and βt is the generalized log-likelihood ratio (GLLR) calculated at time t. Based on (16), the
decision statistic can be recursively updated at each time t as gt ← max{0, gt−1 + βt}, where g0 = 0 [38, Sec. 2.2].
Note that whenever gt reaches zero, the (generalized) CUSUM algorithm updates its change-point estimate τˆ to the current
time t, where the initial change-point estimate is τˆ = 1 [38, Sec. 2.2]. That is, when gt ← 0, we have τˆ ← t. Recall that
the Kalman filter for the post-attack case is employed assuming the normal measurement model (cf. (2)) up to the unknown
change-point τ . We then propose to employ the Kalman filter for the post-attack case based on the estimated change-point τˆ .
Hence, whenever the change-point estimate is updated, the Kalman filter for the post-attack case needs also to be updated.
Recall further that the Kalman filter for the pre-attack case is always employed based on the normal measurement model.
Hence, whenever gt ← 0, the Kalman filter estimates for the post-attack case are updated by setting them to the Kalman filter
estimates for the pre-attack case, i.e., P1t|t ← P0t|t and xˆ1t|t ← xˆ0t|t.
Assuming no attack, xˆ0t|t is the optimal state estimate at time t. Thus, we estimate xt by xˆ
0
t|t for the pre-attack case,
i.e., xˆ0t , xˆ0t|t. On the other hand, we estimate xt by xˆ1t|t−1 for the post-attack case, i.e., xˆ1t , xˆ1t|t−1. This is because the
measurement update step of the Kalman filter for the post-attack case and hence xˆ1t|t depends on estimates of the unknown
attack variables (cf. (12)), and effects of the attack parameters at and σt at time t on xˆ1t need to be blocked to be able to
compute the MLEs of the attack parameters in closed form (cf. numerator in (16)). Note that xˆ1t|t−1 is computed based on the
measurements up to time t− 1, thus xˆ1t|t−1 is independent of the attack parameters at time t.
At first, it may seem unfair that we use the state estimate of the measurement update step, i.e., xˆ0t|t, for the pre-attack case,
and the state prediction, i.e., xˆ1t|t−1, for the post-attack case. However, it essentially improves the performance of the proposed
detection scheme due to the following reasons: (i) in case of no attack, we favor p0(yt|xˆ0t ) over p1(yt | xˆ1t ,at,σt) and hence
10
decrease the false alarm level of the proposed detection scheme, (ii) in case of an attack, since the state estimates for the
post-attack case are recovered whereas the state estimates for the pre-attack case do not have a recovery mechanism, detection
delays are not expected to increase.
Furthermore, based on (16), the following proposition presents the GLLR at time t and the MLEs of the attack variables
for the time interval between t− 1 and t.
Proposition 1: Let ek,t,i , yk,t,i − hTk xˆ1t and ek,t , [ek,t,1, ek,t,2, . . . , ek,t,λ]T. Moreover, let δk,t ,
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i, ζk,t ,∑λ
i=1 e
2
k,t,i, %k,t ,
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i + γ)
2, and $k,t ,
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − γ)2, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}, ∀t > 0. The most likely subset of
meters under no attack, under only FDI attack, under only jamming attack, and under both FDI and jamming attacks during
the time interval between t− 1 and t are classified, respectively as
Sˆ0t =
{
k : u0(ek,t) ≤ uf (ek,t), u0(ek,t) ≤ uj(ek,t), u0(ek,t) ≤ uf,j(ek,t), k = 1, 2, . . . ,K
}
, (17)
Sˆft =
{
k : uf (ek,t) < u
0(ek,t), u
f (ek,t) ≤ uj(ek,t), uf (ek,t) ≤ uf,j(ek,t), k = 1, 2, . . . ,K
}
, (18)
Sˆjt =
{
k : uj(ek,t) < u
0(ek,t), u
j(ek,t) < u
f (ek,t), u
j(ek,t) ≤ uf,j(ek,t), k = 1, 2, . . . ,K
}
, (19)
Sˆf,jt =
{
k : uf,j(ek,t) < u
0(ek,t), u
f,j(ek,t) < u
f (ek,t), u
f,j(ek,t) < u
j(ek,t), k = 1, 2, . . . ,K
}
, (20)
and the GLLR at time t is computed as
βt =
Kλ
2
log(σ2w) +
1
2σ2w
K∑
k=1
λ∑
i=1
(yk,t,i − hTk xˆ0t )2
− 1
2
( ∑
k∈Sˆ0t
u0(ek,t) +
∑
k∈Sˆft
uf (ek,t) +
∑
k∈Sˆjt
uj(ek,t) +
∑
k∈Sˆf,jt
uf,j(ek,t)
)
, (21)
where
u0(ek,t) , λ log(σ2w) +
ζk,t
σ2w
, (22)
uf (ek,t) ,

λ log(σ2w) +
1
σ2w
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − δk,tλ )2, if | δk,tλ | ≥ γ
λ log(σ2w) +
$k,t
σ2w
, if 0 ≤ δk,tλ < γ
λ log(σ2w) +
%k,t
σ2w
, if − γ < δk,tλ < 0,
(23)
uj(ek,t) ,

λ log(
ζk,t
λ ) + λ, if
ζk,t
λ ≥ σ2w + σ2
λ log(σ2w + σ
2) +
ζk,t
σ2w+σ
2 , if
ζk,t
λ < σ
2
w + σ
2,
(24)
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and
uf,j(ek,t) ,

λ log( 1λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − δk,tλ )2) + λ, if | δk,tλ | ≥ γ and 1λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − δk,tλ )2 ≥ σ2w + σ2
λ log(σ2w + σ
2) + 1σ2w+σ2
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − δk,tλ )2, if | δk,tλ | ≥ γ and 1λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − δk,tλ )2 < σ2w + σ2
λ log(
$k,t
λ ) + λ, if 0 ≤ δk,tλ < γ and $k,tλ ≥ σ2w + σ2
λ log(σ2w + σ
2) +
$k,t
σ2w+σ
2 , if 0 ≤ δk,tλ < γ and $k,tλ < σ2w + σ2
λ log(
%k,t
λ ) + λ, if − γ < δk,tλ < 0 and %k,tλ ≥ σ2w + σ2
λ log(σ2w + σ
2) +
%k,t
σ2w+σ
2 , if − γ < δk,tλ < 0 and %k,tλ < σ2w + σ2.
(25)
Furthermore, the MLEs of the attack magnitudes for meter k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} and for the interval between t − 1 and t are
determined as follows:
aˆk,t =

δk,t
λ , if | δk,tλ | ≥ γ and k ∈ Sˆft ∪ Sˆf,jt
γ, if 0 ≤ δk,tλ < γ and k ∈ Sˆft ∪ Sˆf,jt
−γ, if − γ < δk,tλ < 0 and k ∈ Sˆft ∪ Sˆf,jt
0, if k ∈ Sˆ0t ∪ Sˆjt
(26)
and
σˆ2k,t =

−σ2w + ζk,tλ , if ζk,tλ ≥ σ2w + σ2 and k ∈ Sˆjt
σ2, if ζk,tλ < σ
2
w + σ
2 and k ∈ Sˆjt
−σ2w + 1λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − δk,tλ )2, if | δk,tλ | ≥ γ and 1λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − δk,tλ )2 ≥ σ2w + σ2 and k ∈ Sˆf,jt
σ2, if | δk,tλ | ≥ γ and 1λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − δk,tλ )2 < σ2w + σ2 and k ∈ Sˆf,jt
−σ2w + $k,tλ , if 0 ≤ δk,tλ < γ and $k,tλ ≥ σ2w + σ2 and k ∈ Sˆf,jt
σ2, if 0 ≤ δk,tλ < γ and $k,tλ < σ2w + σ2 and k ∈ Sˆf,jt
−σ2w + %k,tλ , if − γ < δk,tλ < 0 and %k,tλ ≥ σ2w + σ2 and k ∈ Sˆf,jt
σ2, if − γ < δk,tλ < 0 and %k,tλ < σ2w + σ2 and k ∈ Sˆf,jt
0, if k ∈ Sˆ0t ∪ Sˆft .
(27)
Proof: See Appendix A.
The proposed online detection and estimation algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1. At each time t, firstly the prediction
step of the Kalman filters is implemented. Then, the most likely attack type (or no attack) and the attack parameters for
each meter are determined. Based on the estimates of the attack variables, the measurement update step of the Kalman
filters is implemented. Then, the GLLR is computed and the decision statistic is updated. If the decision statistic crosses
the predetermined test threshold, then an attack is declared. Otherwise, it proceeds to the next time interval and further
measurements are collected. Moreover, if the decision statistic reaches zero, the Kalman filter estimates for the post-attack
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Algorithm 1 Real-time attack detection and estimation
1: Initialization: t← 0, g0 ← 0, τˆ ← 1
2: while gt < h do
3: t← t+ 1
4: Implement the prediction step of the Kalman filters using (9) and (11).
5: Compute u0(ek,t), uf (ek,t), uj(ek,t), and uf,j(ek,t), ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} using (22), (23), (24), and (25), respectively.
6: Classification: compute Sˆ0t , Sˆft , Sˆjt , and Sˆf,jt using (17), (18), (19), and (20), respectively.
7: Compute aˆt and σˆt using (26) and (27), respectively.
8: Implement the measurement update step of the Kalman filters using (10) and (12).
9: Compute βt using (21).
10: Update the decision statistic: gt ← max{0, gt−1 + βt}
11: if gt = 0 then
12: τˆ ← t
13: xˆ1t|t ← xˆ0t|t
14: P1t|t ← P0t|t
15: end if
16: end while
17: T ← t, declare a cyber-attack.
case are updated before proceeding to the next time interval. Recall that Algorithm 1 keeps a change point estimate τˆ . Hence,
after an attack is declared at time T , to help for a quick system recovery, {xˆ1t|t : τˆ ≤ t ≤ T} can be reported as the recovered
state estimates and further, estimates of the attack types and the set of attacked meters can be reported for the time interval
between τˆ and T .
Remark 2: The detector parameters γ and σ2 can be determined by the system designer based on the system requirements,
i.e., the desired level of false alarm rate. The system designer firstly determines the desired minimum level of average false
alarm period, i.e., α. If the frequency of false alarms needs to be decreased, then α is chosen higher. After choosing α, the
system designer chooses the values of γ, σ2, and the test threshold h in order to achieve an average false alarm period that
is larger than or equal to α. For a higher level of α, higher values of γ, σ2, and h need to be chosen. On the other hand,
higher values of γ, σ2, and h lead to larger detection delays. Hence, the system designer can choose such parameters to strike
a desired balance between false alarm rate and the detection delays.
IV. STEALTHY ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES
We firstly discuss stealthy attacks against a CUSUM detector, which can be employed in a simple case where the pre- and
post-attack pdfs are known. Discussion on the stealthy attacks against a CUSUM detector is useful since similar forms of
stealthy attacks can be performed against all CUSUM-based detectors. We then particularly discuss stealthy attacks against
the proposed detector, i.e., Algorithm 1, where the pre- and post-attack pdfs are unknown and time-varying, as explained in
Sec. III. Finally, we present some countermeasures against the considered stealthy attacks.
A. Stealthy Attacks Against a CUSUM Detector
Suppose the pre- and post-attack measurement pdfs are known and denoted with f0 and f1, respectively such that yt ∼ f0
for t < τ and yt ∼ f1 for t ≥ τ . In this case, the CUSUM algorithm is the optimum solution to (14) [41], given by
TCUSUM = inf{t : gt ≥ h}, gt = max{0, gt−1 + `t}, (28)
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where TCUSUM denotes the stopping time, h is the test threshold, gt is the decision statistic at time t, and `t , log
( f1(yt)
f0(yt)
)
is
the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) at time t.
1) Non-persistent attacks: The CUSUM algorithm is mainly designed for detecting persistent changes, i.e., it is assumed that
an attack is launched at an unknown time τ and continued thereafter. It accumulates evidence (LLR) over time and declares a
change (attack/anomaly) only if the accumulated evidence is reliably high (cf. (28)). Hence, with the purpose of increasing the
detection delay of the CUSUM algorithm, a smart attacker can design an on-off attacking strategy to perform an intermittent
(non-persistent) attack. That is, it can attack for a period of time, then wait for a period of time and repeat this procedure
over its attacking period with the aim of keeping the decision statistic of the CUSUM algorithm, i.e., gt, below the decision
threshold h for t ≥ τ so that the attack can be continued without being noticed.
Since the measurements yt are essentially random variables, an attacker cannot control the decision statistic deterministically;
it can control it only on average. Note that attackers usually need simple and effective attacking strategies that require the
minimum possible knowledge. Let KL(f1, f0) ,
∫
f1(y) log(
f1(y)
f0(y)
)dy denote the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between
f1 and f0. The following proposition presents a simple necessary condition for an attacker, having the knowledge of f0 and
f1, to determine the on and off periods of a non-persistent stealthy attack against the CUSUM detector.
Proposition 2: Let h′ ≥ KL(f1, f0) be a threshold chosen by the attacker. The on and off periods have to be chosen as
Ton ≤ h
′
KL(f1, f0)
and Toff >
h′
KL(f0, f1)
in order to satisfy E[gt] ≤ h′ for t ≥ τ , where Ton and Toff are positive integers denoting the on and off periods, respectively.
Proof. We have
E[gt] = E[max{0, gt−1 + `t}]
≥ max{0,E[gt−1 + `t]} = max{0,E[gt−1] + E[`t]}, (29)
where the inequality is due to the fact that gt−1 + `t can take negative values in general (−∞ < `t <∞).
If yt ∼ f1, then
E[`t] =
∫
f1(y) log(
f1(y)
f0(y)
)dy = KL(f1, f0) > 0,
and if yt ∼ f0, then
E[`t] =
∫
f0(y) log(
f1(y)
f0(y)
)dy = −KL(f0, f1) < 0.
Let
ρt , max{0,E[gt−1] + E[`t]} (30)
be a lower bound on E[gt] (cf. (29)). Since (i) gt = 0 at t = 0 (hence, E[g0] = 0) and (ii) for t ≤ τ−1, E[`t] = −KL(f0, f1) < 0,
based on (30), we have ρt = 0 for t ≤ τ−1. Further, based on (30), with an on period of Ton = h′/KL(f1, f0) (when yt ∼ f1)
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and an off period of Toff = h′/KL(f0, f1) (when yt ∼ f0), we have 0 ≤ ρt ≤ h′ for t ≥ τ .
Since ρt is a lower bound for E[gt] for t > 0, in order to satisfy E[gt] ≤ h′ for t ≥ τ , the on period needs to be chosen
smaller than h′/KL(f1, f0) and/or the off period needs to be chosen larger than h′/KL(f0, f1).
For a stealthy attack, the attacker needs to choose h′ such that h′ < h. Further, ∆ , h− h′ can be considered as a margin
for non-detectability. That is, as ∆ increases, gt, t ≥ τ takes smaller values on average, that increases the average detection
delay of the CUSUM algorithm. Based on Proposition 2, the average on (attacking) period is upper bounded with
T¯on ,
Ton
Ton + Toff
<
KL(f0, f1)
KL(f1, f0) + KL(f0, f1)
.
Note that the upper bound on T¯on is independent of h′ and hence of ∆. However, for a higher T¯on, either Ton needs to be
increased or Toff needs to be decreased, that both increases E[gt], t ≥ τ and hence decreases the average detection delay.
Further, note that a stealthy attack can especially be effective if the system has strict false alarm constraints, i.e., requiring
high level of false alarm periods and equivalently a high threshold h.
2) Persistent attacks: The CUSUM algorithm may not be effective in attack detection if the attack does not comply with
the presumed attack model. If an attacker knows that the CUSUM detector is employed based on the post-attack pdf f1, then
it can perform a stealthy persistent attack with a post-attack density f ′1 6= f1. The design goal can be keeping f ′1 as closest as
possible to the post-attack pdf f1 for a strong attack while limiting the risk of being detected. Since the attack is of persistent
nature, f ′1 needs to be designed such that the decision statistic of the CUSUM algorithm does not increase on average over
time. Since the CUSUM algorithm accumulates the LLRs over time (cf. (28)), the LLR can be designed such that it takes
non-positive values on the average, i.e., E[`t] ≤ 0, t > 0. Then, since E[`t] = −KL(f0, f1) < 0 for t ≤ τ − 1, the condition
E[`t] ≤ 0, t ≥ τ needs to be satisfied. Considering the KL divergence KL(f ′1, f1) as the information distance between f ′1 and
f1, the following optimization problem can be considered:
min
f ′1
KL(f ′1, f1) subject to E[`t] ≤ 0, t ≥ τ, (31)
where the solution is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: The solution of (31) is given by
{f ′1 : KL(f ′1, f0) = KL(f ′1, f1)}. (32)
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Proof. Let yt ∼ f ′1 for t ≥ τ . Then,
E[`t] =
∫
f ′1(y) log
(f1(y)
f0(y)
)
dy
=
∫
f ′1(y) log(f1(y))dy −
∫
f ′1(y) log(f0(y))dy
=
∫
f ′1(y) log(f1(y))dy −
∫
f ′1(y) log(f
′
1(y))dy +
∫
f ′1(y) log(f
′
1(y))dy −
∫
f ′1(y) log(f0(y))dy
=
∫
f ′1(y) log
(f1(y)
f ′1(y)
)
dy +
∫
f ′1(y) log
(f ′1(y)
f0(y)
)
dy
= −KL(f ′1, f1) + KL(f ′1, f0).
Then, the constraint in (31), i.e., E[`t] ≤ 0, implies that −KL(f ′1, f1) + KL(f ′1, f0) ≤ 0, which is equivalent to KL(f ′1, f1) ≥
KL(f ′1, f0). Hence, the minimum value of KL(f
′
1, f1) is KL(f
′
1, f0).
Proposition 3 presents a simple strategy for an attacker to perform a persistent stealthy attack against a CUSUM detector.
As an example, let f0 ∼ N ([µ0 µ0]T, σ2 I2) and f1 ∼ N ([µ1 µ1]T, σ2 I2). If
f ′1 ∼ N
([
1
2 (µ0+µ1)
1
2 (µ0+µ1)
]
,
[
σ2 ϕ
ϕ σ2
])
,
then it can be checked that
KL(f ′1, f0) = KL(f
′
1, f1)
=
1
4σ2
(µ1 − µ0)2 + 1
2
log
( σ4
σ4 − ϕ2
)
,
where the correlation term ϕ can be chosen such that σ4 − ϕ2 > 0.
B. Stealthy Attacks Against Algorithm 1
In the actual problem under consideration, the pre- and post-attack measurement pdfs, i.e., p0(yt|xt) and p1(yt|xt,at,σt),
are based on some unknown and time-varying variables and hence the results in the previous subsection do not directly apply.
The proposed algorithm estimates the pre- and post-attack pdfs at time t as p0(yt|xˆ0t ) and p1(yt|xˆ1t , aˆt, σˆt), respectively where
xˆ0t and xˆ
1
t are computed via the Kalman filters, aˆt is given in (26), and σˆt is given in (27). Then, the GLLR at time t is
computed as follows (cf. (16)):
βt = log
(p1(yt|xˆ1t , aˆt, σˆt)
p0(yt|xˆ0t )
)
. (33)
Note that computing xˆ0t and xˆ
1
t requires the knowledge of all previously taken measurements, i.e., {yj , j ≤ t}. Hence, for
an attacker, estimating the pre- and post-attack pdfs and hence computing βt and gt requires monitoring all the system-wide
measurements at all times, which is practically infeasible. Although determining the online attack parameters for a stealthy
attack is difficult in general, we provide below a brief analysis of the proposed algorithm and discuss possible stealthy attacks
against it based on this analysis and the intuitions gained in Sec. IV-A. As before, since the measurements are random, an
attacker can control the decision statistic only on the average.
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Firstly, based on (33), βt depends on how close (relatively) the state estimates xˆ0t and xˆ
1
t to the actual system state xt and
how accurate the MLEs of the attack magnitudes aˆt and σˆt compared to the actual attack magnitudes at and σt are. During the
pre-attack period, the measurements yt follow the normal measurement model (2) and hence at = 0 and σt = 0. Since xˆ0t is
computed assuming no attack, for t ≤ τ−1, xˆ0t is usually a better estimate of the actual system state xt compared to xˆ1t due to
the possible ML estimation errors in computing aˆt, σˆt, and xˆ1t (recall that (cf. (12)) xˆ
1
t is computed based on aˆt and σˆt). Then,
p0(yt|xˆ0t ) is expected to fit better to yt compared to p1(yt|xˆ1t , aˆt, σˆt), i.e., we usually have p0(yt|xˆ0t ) ≥ p1(yt|xˆ1t , aˆt, σˆt) for
t ≤ τ − 1. Then, based on (33), βt is expected to take nonpositive values in general, that makes gt ≈ 0 a good approximation
for t ≤ τ − 1.
The main aim of an attacker against the smart grid is deviating the state estimates from the actual system state as much
as possible without being detected. Hence, it needs to keep gt below the level of h as long as possible for t ≥ τ (cf. (16)).
Similar to the stealthy attacks against the CUSUM algorithm discussed in Sec. IV-A, an attacker can either follow an on-off
attacking strategy or perform persistent attacks that do not comply with the presumed attack magnitudes (cf. (15)). Note that
in case of an attack, i.e., for t ≥ τ , xˆ0t deviates from xt since it is computed assuming no attack. On the other hand, xˆ1t is a
recovered state estimate, but it is subject to possible ML estimation errors.
1) Non-persistent attacks: Since Algorithm 1 is a CUSUM-based detector, stealthy intermittent (on-off) attacking can be
performed against it. Specifically, during the on periods, an attacker can choose its attack magnitudes comparable to or larger
than the presumed lower bounds on the attack magnitudes, i.e., γ and σ2, with the purpose of a strong attack. However, as
explained before, analytically deriving the on-off periods and the online attack magnitudes seems infeasible for an attacker.
Hence, a smart attacker, having the knowledge of system and detector parameters, can determine its attack parameters based
on an offline simulation.
When the attack complies with the presumed attack magnitudes, during an on period, xˆ0t usually deviates from the actual
system state more than xˆ1t due to the recovery mechanism in computing xˆ
1
t (cf. (12)). That makes p1(yt|xˆ1t , aˆt, σˆt) a better
fit to yt compared to p0(yt|xˆ0t ) on the average. Then, if an on-off attack is performed, during the on periods, based on
(33), usually βt takes non-negative values and gt increases. Further, at the beginning of an off period after an on period,
although the attack magnitudes are zero, i.e., at = σt = 0, since xˆ1t is still a better (recovered) state estimate compared to xˆ
0
t ,
p1(yt|xˆ1t , aˆt, σˆt) can still be a better fit to yt and gt may further increase. Note that during an off period, xˆ0t is not expected
to deviate further since yt now follows the normal measurement model. On the other hand, aˆt, σˆt, and xˆ1t are still subject to
possible ML estimation errors. That may make p0(yt|xˆ0t ) a better fit to yt over time and as the off period is continued, βt may
start to take nonpositive values on the average. Since gt is expected to increase in an on period as well as in the beginning of
an off period, the level of attack magnitudes during the on periods needs to be carefully chosen in accordance with the aim
of keeping the highest value of gt below the decision threshold h, for t ≥ τ .
2) Persistent attacks: Since Algorithm 1 relies on the lower bounds γ and σ2 defined on the attack magnitudes (cf. (15)),
an attacker can perform persistent stealthy attacks using significantly small attack magnitudes compared to γ and σ2 so that
Algorithm 1 becomes ineffective to detect such attacks. In case of such small-magnitude stealthy attacks, the attack magnitudes
at and σt are close to zero for t ≥ τ and due to the possible ML estimation errors in computing aˆt and σˆt, xˆ1t usually
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deviates more compared to xˆ0t , similarly to the pre-attack period discussed before. Then, p0(yt|xˆ0t ) fits better to yt compared
to p1(yt|xˆ1t , aˆt, σˆt) on the average. Hence, in case of a persistent small-magnitude attack, based on (33), βt usually takes
nonpositive values and the approximation gt ≈ 0 can still be valid. Note that even if an attacker has an incomplete knowledge
about the system and detector parameters, it can still perform stealthy attacks with small attack magnitudes. Although such
small-magnitude attacks have minimal effects on the system performance in the short run, they can be effective over long
periods of time. Hence, they need to be detected with reasonable detection delays.
C. Countermeasures Against Stealthy Attacks
We firstly discuss countermeasures against the on-off attacking strategy, i.e., the non-persistent stealthy attacks. We then
discuss a countermeasure against the persistent stealthy attacks where the attacks may not comply with the presumed attack
model/magnitudes. Finally, we propose a new detection scheme, i.e., Algorithm 2, that simultaneously employs Algorithm 1
and the proposed countermeasures with the aim of being effective against a diverse range of potential cyber-attacks.
1) Countermeasures against the non-persistent stealthy attacks: Timely detection of cyber-attacks against the smart grid is
crucial since any failure may quickly spread over the network. Hence, in practice, detection delays cannot be allowed to be
arbitrarily large. Note that the optimization problem stated in (14) does not impose any constraints on the maximum tolerable
detection delay. In an alternative quickest detection problem considered in [42], the objective is maximizing the probability of
detection in at most η time units after an attack occurs, where τ ≤ T < τ + η needs to be satisfied for a successful detection.
In the extreme case of the considered non-persistent stealthy attacks, the attacker can choose its on period as Ton = 1. In
such a case, the attack needs to be detected using the measurements obtained during a single time interval in the attacking
regime and hence η = 1 needs to be chosen. Then, we consider the following optimization problem, proposed in [42]:
sup
T
p(T ) subject to E∞[T ] ≥ α, (34)
where
p(T ) = inf
τ
ess inf
Fτ
Pτ
(
T = τ |Fτ , T ≥ τ
)
is the worst-case (in the Lorden’s sense) detection probability after obtaining the first measurements in the attacking regime.
Shewhart Test: In case the pre- and post-attack pdfs are known as in Sec. IV-A, the optimum solution to (34) is the Shewhart
test [42, Theorem 2.3], given by
TS = inf{t : `t ≥ ν}, (35)
where TS denotes the stopping time and the threshold ν is determined such that P∞(`1 ≥ ν) = 1/α. Note that the Shewhart
test in (35) is, in fact, the repeated log-likelihood ratio test (LLRT), i.e., at each time, the LLR is compared with a certain
threshold and an alarm is triggered at the first time the LLR crosses the threshold. We then propose the Shewhart test as a
countermeasure to the non-persistent stealthy attacks against the CUSUM detector. Note that ν needs to be chosen sufficiently
high to prevent frequent false alarms.
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Generalized Shewhart Test: In case the pre- and post-attack pdfs are unknown and time-varying, we can only compute
the GLLR βt. Hence, as a countermeasure, we propose to employ the generalized Shewhart test, i.e., the repeated generalized
LLRT (GLLRT), given by
T ′ = inf{t : βt ≥ φ}, (36)
where T ′ is the stopping time and φ is the test threshold. Again, a sufficiently high threshold needs to be chosen to prevent
frequent false alarms. Moreover, similar to Algorithm 1, by choosing higher γ and/or σ2, false alarm rate of the generalized
Shewhart test can be reduced (see Remark 2).
Note that the generalized Shewhart test is expected to be mainly effective in detecting significant instantaneous increases in
the level of GLLR and hence in detecting non-persistent stealthy attacks during the on periods. That is, even if an attack may
be missed by Algorithm 1 since the decision statistic gt may not achieve reliably high values for t ≥ τ due to the subsequent
off period after an on period, the generalized Shewhart test can detect such non-persistent increases during the on periods.
2) A countermeasure against the persistent stealthy attacks: Non-parametric detection techniques do not assume any attack
models and only evaluate the deviation of measurement statistics from the baseline (no attack) statistics. However, they are
usually less effective if the attacks comply with the presumed attack models. As explained before, a persistent stealthy attack
can be performed if an attack does not match the considered attack models or magnitudes. For such cases, parametric detectors
such as Algorithm 1 and the generalized Shewhart test become ineffective and the non-parametric detection techniques become
more appropriate.
In case of no attack, i.e., for t < τ , ct , rtTQt−1rt is a chi-square random variable with Kλ degrees of freedom [18],
where rt denotes the measurement innovation signal at time t, given as
rt , yt −Hxˆ0t|t−1,
and Qt is the measurement prediction covariance matrix at time t, calculated as follows:
Qt , HPt|t−1HT + σ2w IKλ.
Notice that although the distribution of the measurements yt is time-varying and unknown due to the dynamic system state
xt, the distribution of ct is time-invariant and known in case of no attack, i.e., for t < τ . Hence, whether the sequence {ct}
fits to the chi-squared distribution or not can be evaluated via a goodness-of-fit test and if not, an attack/anomaly is declared.
Sliding-Window Chi-Squared Test: We partition the range of ct, i.e., [0,∞), into M mutually exclusive and disjoint
intervals Ij , j = 1, 2, . . . ,M such that p1 = P (ct ∈ I1), p2 = P (ct ∈ I2), . . . , pM = P (ct ∈ IM ). Hence, p1, p2, . . . , pM
denote the probabilities that ct belongs to the intervals I1, I2, . . . , IM , respectively for t < τ , where
∑M
j=1 pj = 1. The
intervals I1, I2, . . . , IM can be determined using the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of a chi-squared random variable
with Kλ degrees of freedom. Then, the null hypothesis is that ct belongs to the intervals I1, I2, . . . , IM with probabilities
p1, p2, . . . , pM , respectively.
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We propose to employ an online test to evaluate whether the most recent sliding window of ct’s fits to the null hypothesis. Let
the size of the sliding window be L. Then, the sliding window at time t, denoted with Wt, consists of {cj : t−L+1 ≤ j ≤ t}.
Let the number of samples in Wt belonging to the predetermined disjoint intervals be denoted with N1,t, N2,t, . . . , NM,t,
respectively where
∑M
i=1Ni,t = L,∀t. Since we have a multinomial distribution where the expected number of samples in the
disjoint intervals are Lp1, Lp2, . . . , LpM , respectively, the Pearson’s chi-squared test can be used to evaluate the goodness of
fit, that can be written as
T ′′ = inf{t : χt ≥ ϕ}, (37)
where
χt =
M∑
i=1
(Ni,t − Lpi)2
Lpi
(38)
is the asymptotically (as L→∞) chi-squared distributed test statistic with M−1 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis,
ϕ is the test threshold that can be determined using the cdf of a chi-squared random variable for a desired significance level,
and T ′′ denotes the stopping time. To improve the accuracy of the detector, M can be chosen higher. Note, however, that as
M is increased, the window size L needs also to be increased to improve the reliability of the goodness-of-fit test, that will
cause larger detection delays.
The chi-squared test does not assume any attack model a priori and it only evaluates deviation of observed measurements
from the baseline statistics corresponding to the normal system operation. We propose to use the chi-squared test to have a
detection scheme that is robust against (i) low-magnitude stealthy attacks that corresponds to small deviations from the baseline
for which our proposed parametric detectors (Algorithm 1 and the generalized Shewhart test) become ineffective to detect, and
(ii) attacks that do not comply with the presumed hybrid attack model, e.g., non-Gaussian or correlated jamming noise.
Remark 3: The proposed chi-squared test is a sequential version of the Pearson’s chi-squared test since the most recent
sliding window of samples is used in the test. Furthermore, the proposed test is different from the outlier detector in [18], that
makes sample by sample decisions, i.e., it declares a single sample as either normal and anomalous. The proposed test is thus
more reliable and more sensitive to small deviations from the baseline since it considers long-term deviations by evaluating a
sliding window of samples.
3) Proposed final detection scheme: Our aim is to obtain a detection mechanism that is effective against a significantly
wide range of cyber-attacks. Hence, we propose to simultaneously employ Algorithm 1, the generalized Shewhart test, and the
sliding-window chi-squared test and declare an attack at the first time instant one of the detectors declares an attack (if any).
Hence,
T˜ = inf{T, T ′, T ′′}
is the proposed stopping time. We summarize the proposed detector in Algorithm 2. Note that the average false alarm period of
Algorithm 2 is less than the minimum of the (individual) average false alarm periods of Algorithm 1, the generalized Shewhart
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Algorithm 2 Real-time detection of hybrid and stealthy attacks
1: Initialization: t ← 0, g0 ← 0, τˆ ← 1, choose the entries of the initial sliding window of the chi-squared test, i.e., W0, as realizations
of a chi-squared random variable with Kλ degrees of freedom.
2: while gt < h and βt < φ and χt < ϕ do
3: t← t+ 1
4: Implement the lines 4–15 in Algorithm 1.
5: rt ← yt −Hxˆ0t|t−1
6: Qt ← HPt|t−1HT + σ2w IKλ
7: ct ← rtTQt−1rt
8: Update Wt with the most recent entry ct.
9: Update N1,t, N2,t, . . . , NM,t and compute χt using (38).
10: end while
11: T˜ ← t, declare a cyber-attack.
test, and the sliding-window chi-squared test. Hence, sufficiently high thresholds, i.e., h, φ and ϕ, need to be chosen to prevent
frequent false alarms. Furthermore, to have the same average false alarm periods α for Algorithms 1 and 2, the threshold h
needs to be chosen higher in Algorithm 2 and the thresholds φ and ϕ need to be chosen such that the individual average false
alarm periods of the generalized Shewhart test and the sliding-window chi-squared tests are greater than α.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed detection schemes via simple case studies in an IEEE-14
bus power system, where K = 23 and N = 13. The system matrix A is chosen to be an identity matrix, the measurement
matrix H is determined based on the IEEE-14 bus power system, and λ = 5 is chosen. The initial state variables are obtained
through the DC optimal power flow algorithm for case-14 in MATPOWER [43]. The system noise variances are chosen as
σ2v = σ
2
w = 10
−4. Furthermore, the parameters of Algorithm 1 are chosen as γ = 0.022 and σ2 = 10−2. In Algorithm 2, the
threshold of the generalized Shewhart test is chosen as φ = 10. Moreover, for the chi-squared test, the window size is chosen as
L = 80, number of disjoint intervals are chosen as M = 5, the probabilities are chosen as p1 = p2 = · · · = p5 = 0.2, and the
intervals I1, I2, . . . , I5 are determined accordingly as I1 = [0, 102.081), I2 = [102.081, 110.5475), I3 = [110.5475, 118.2061),
I4 = [118.2061, 127.531), and I5 = [127.531,∞) based on the cdf of a chi-squared random variable with Kλ = 115 degrees
of freedom. The threshold of the Pearson’s chi-squared test, i.e., ϕ = 25.0133, is chosen based on the significance level of
5× 10−5 for a chi-squared random variable with M − 1 = 4 degrees of freedom. The thresholds of the generalized Shewhart
and the chi-squared tests are chosen such that the (individual) average false alarm periods of these tests are in the order of
104. The cyber-attacks are launched at t = 100.
Firstly, we evaluate the performance of the proposed schemes in case of an FDI-only attack, a jamming-only attack, and a
hybrid attack. We then evaluate the performance in case of stealthy hybrid attacks. Particularly, we consider a non-persistent
stealthy attack and a small-magnitude persistent stealthy attack, and illustrate the performance improvement obtained with the
proposed countermeasures against such stealthy attacks. Next, we illustrate the mean squared error (MSE) vs. time plot for
the recovered and non-recovered state estimates in case of a hybrid cyber-attack. Finally, we evaluate the performance of the
proposed schemes in case of a network topology attack/failure.
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A. Case 1: FDI Attack
We firstly consider a random and time-varying persistent FDI attack where at each time the attacker chooses the magnitudes
of the injected false data and the set of attacked meters randomly. In particular, at each time, the attacker compromises the
measurements of each meter with probability 0.5 and injects the realizations of the uniform random variable U [−0.02, 0.02] to
the attacked meters. Fig. 1 illustrates the tradeoff between the average detection delay and the average false alarm period for
the proposed algorithms and also three benchmark tests, namely the nonparametric CUSUM test in [29], the Euclidean detector
[17] and the cosine-similarity metric based detector [19] that both check the dissimilarity between the actual and the predicted
measurements (by the Kalman filter) and declare an anomaly if the dissimilarity metric is greater than certain thresholds.
Since a nonlinear power system model is studied in [29] and we use a linear system model, we include a modified version
of the nonparametric CUSUM detector for the linear case. The stopping time and the update of the decision statistic over time
for the modified nonparametric CUSUM detector are given as follows:
T¯ , inf {t : St ≥ q} ,
St = St−1 + δt,
δt , ‖yt −Hxˆ0t|t−1‖ − E0
[‖yt −Hxˆ0t|t−1‖],
where T¯ denotes the corresponding stopping time, St is the decision statistic at time t where S0 = 0, q is the test threshold
that controls the false alarm rate of the detector, and E0[‖yt − Hxˆ0t|t−1‖] denotes the expectation of the L2 norm of the
measurement innovation signal in the pre-change case, computed via a Monte Carlo simulation. The nonparametric CUSUM
detector accumulates the difference between magnitude of the measurement innovation signal and its expected value in the
pre-change case (normal system operation).
We observe that the proposed algorithms significantly outperform the benchmark tests. Moreover, Algorithm 1 slightly
outperforms Algorithm 2. This is because the countermeasures introduced in Algorithm 2 slightly increase the false alarm rate
of Algorithm 2. Note that in obtaining the tradeoff curve for Algorithm 2, we keep the thresholds φ and ϕ constant and only
vary h.
We then illustrate the performance of the proposed algorithms as the magnitude of the injected false data varies while
keeping the false alarm rate constant. We again consider the random and time-varying persistent FDI attack described above,
but this time the magnitudes of the injected data are realizations of U [−θ, θ], where θ varies between 0.009 and 0.03. Through
Fig. 2, we see the advantage of the proposed countermeasures as the magnitude of the false data takes very small values. For
instance, when θ = 0.009, the average detection delays of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 are 48.02 and 39.45, respectively.
B. Case 2: Jamming Attack
Next, we consider a random and time-varying persistent jamming attack. At each time, an attacker jams the measurements of
each meter with probability 0.5 where the variances of the jamming noise are the realizations of the uniform random variable
U [2 × 10−4, 4 × 10−4]. Fig. 3 presents the delay to false alarm curve for the proposed algorithms and the benchmark tests.
Further, we evaluate the performance as the magnitude of the jamming noise variance varies by keeping the false alarm rate
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Fig. 1: Average detection delay vs. average false alarm period for the proposed detectors and the benchmark tests in case of
a random FDI attack.
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Fig. 2: Average detection delay vs. magnitude of the injected false data for the proposed detectors in case of a random FDI
attack, where the average false alarm period is approximately 1.5× 104.
constant. In particular, jamming noise variances are chosen as realizations of U [ϑ, 2ϑ], where ϑ is varied between 0.75σ2w and
3σ2w. Through Fig. 4, we again observe smaller detection delays in Algorithm 2 compared to Algorithm 1 in case of very
small attack magnitudes.
C. Case 3: Hybrid FDI/Jamming Attack
Next, we consider a random and time-varying persistent hybrid attack. The attack is combined over the system and it may
also be combined over a subset of meters. In particular, we consider the attacks described in Sec. V-A and Sec. V-B altogether.
Hence, the attacker chooses a random subset of meters for FDI attack and another random subset of meters for jamming attack,
where these subsets might overlap with each other. The attack magnitudes for FDI and jamming attacks are realizations of
U [−0.02, 0.02] and U [2× 10−4, 4× 10−4], respectively. In Fig. 5, for the same levels of false alarm rate, we observe smaller
detection delays compared to Figures 1 and 3, as expected.
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Fig. 3: Average detection delay vs. average false alarm period for the proposed detectors and the benchmark tests in case of
a random jamming attack.
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Fig. 4: Average detection delay vs. variance of the jamming noise for the proposed detectors in case of a random jamming
attack, where the average false alarm period is approximately 1.5× 104.
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Fig. 5: Average detection delay vs. average false alarm period for the proposed detectors and the benchmark tests in case of
a hybrid attack.
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Fig. 6: Missed detection ratio vs. average false alarm period for the proposed detectors and the benchmark tests in case of a
stealthy non-persistent attack, where the attack is assumed to be missed if it is not detected within 50 time units.
D. Case 4: Non-persistent Stealthy Attack
Next, we consider a stealthily designed on-off attack. Particularly, after the attack is launched at t = 100, the attacker
performs a hybrid attack as described in Sec. V-C where the magnitudes of the FDI and jamming attacks are realizations of
U [−0.01, 0.01] and U [10−4, 2 × 10−4], respectively and the on and off periods are Ton = 1 and Toff = 3, respectively. As
an example, we choose the maximum tolerable detection delay as 50 time units and if the attack cannot be detected within
this period, we assume that the attack is missed. In Fig. 6, we present the missed detection ratio versus average false alarm
period for the proposed algorithms and the benchmark tests. As discussed in Sec. IV-C.1, against the non-persistent attacks,
mainly the generalized Shewhart test is expected to perform well. That is, due to the off periods, even though the accumulated
evidence supporting change may not become reliably high to declare an attack in Algorithm 1, the GLLR may take high values
during the on periods. On the other hand, since the threshold of the generalized Shewhart test is chosen very high (φ = 10)
to reduce the false alarm level of Algorithm 2, the missed detection ratios in Algorithms 1 and 2 are almost the same for
the small levels of average false alarm period, i.e., for the small test thresholds. However, for higher levels of average false
alarm period, the missed detection ratio of Algorithm 2 significantly decreases compared to Algorithm 1 and the advantage of
introducing the generalized Shewhart test in Algorithm 2 becomes visible in detecting the non-persistent stealthy attacks.
E. Case 5: Persistent Stealthy Attack
Although the considered lower bounds γ and σ2 on the attack magnitudes are already very small, an attacker may still
perform a persistent stealthy attack using even lower attack magnitudes. Recall that we have previously showed in Figures
2 and 4 the advantage of Algorithm 2 over Algorithm 1 as the attack magnitudes get smaller for the FDI and jamming
attacks, respectively. This time, we consider a hybrid attack with even smaller attack magnitudes where the magnitudes of
FDI and jamming attacks are chosen as realizations of U [−0.005, 0.005] and U [0.5 × 10−4, 10−4], respectively. We present
the missed detection ratio versus the average false alarm period curve for the proposed algorithms and the benchmark tests in
Fig. 7. We observe that Algorithm 2 significantly outperforms Algorithm 1 due to the introduced non-parametric chi-squared
test in Algorithm 2. Since the attack magnitudes are very small, the proposed parametric tests become ineffective to detect
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Fig. 7: Missed detection ratio vs. average false alarm period for the proposed detectors and the benchmark tests in case of a
stealthy small-magnitude persistent attack, where the attack is assumed to be missed if it is not detected within 50 time units.
such stealthy attacks. Note that although the non-parametric goodness-of-fit tests such as the chi-squared test becomes more
successful in detecting such small-magnitude stealthy attacks, they in general lead to longer detection delays compared to the
considered parametric tests since they usually require more samples for a reliable decision, mainly because they ignore all the
prior knowledge about the post-attack case.
F. Algorithm 1 vs. Countermeasures Against Stealthy Attacks
With the purpose of illustrating the advantages of additional countermeasures employed in Algorithm 2 more clearly, Fig. 8
shows a comparison between Algorithm 1 and the countermeasures in case of stealthy attacks described in Sec. V-D and
Sec. V-E. Here, the individual average false alarm periods of Algorithm 1, the generalized Shewhart test, and the sliding-
window chi-squared test are nearly equal to each other and for the non-persistent and persistent stealthy attacks, the figure
shows the ratios over all trials at which each algorithm detects the attack first (with the minimum delay), where more than
one test may simultaneously declare an attack with the minimum delay. Through the figure, we observe that the generalized
Shewhart and the sliding-window chi-squared tests outperform Algorithm 1 in case of non-persistent and persistent stealthy
attacks, respectively. Hence, together with the results obtained through Figures 6 and 7, we can conclude that in case of stealthy
attacks, the countermeasures improve the detection performance of Algorithm 2 compared to Algorithm 1.
G. Recovered State Estimates
Fig. 9 presents the MSE versus time curve for the recovered, i.e., xˆ1t|t, and the non-recovered, i.e., xˆ
0
t|t, state estimates
during the pre-change period, i.e., for t < 100, and the first 50 time units after a hybrid FDI/jamming attack is launched to
the system at τ = 100. The FDI and jamming attacks are both of persistent nature as described in Sec. V-C and the attack
magnitudes are realizations of U [−0.1, 0.1] and U [1, 2], respectively. Through the figure, we observe that the MSE of the
recovered state estimates is significantly smaller than the MSE of the non-recovered state estimates. Further, we observe that
the recovered state estimates slightly deviate from the actual system state xt over the attacking period. This is due to the fact
that the MLEs of the attack variables are computed based on the recovered state estimates (cf. (26) and (27)) and also the
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Fig. 8: Ratio of trials at which Algorithm 1, the generalized Shewhart test, and the sliding-window chi-squared test detect
the stealthy attacks first (with the minimum delay), where the individual average false alarm periods of the algorithms are
approximately 1.5× 104.
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Fig. 9: MSE vs. time for the recovered (xˆ1t|t) and non-recovered (xˆ
0
t|t) state estimates in case of a hybrid attack.
recovered state estimates are computed based on the MLEs of the attack variables (cf. (12)). Hence, the ML estimation errors
accumulate over time during the attacking period. However, since the attacks can be quickly detected with the proposed real-
time detection schemes, the deviation of the recovered state estimates is not expected to be significantly high at the detection
time. Furthermore, recall that during the pre-attack period, whenever the decision statistic of Algorithm 1 reaches zero, the
state estimates for the post-attack case are updated as being equal to the state estimates for the pre-attack case. Since the
decision statistic frequently reaches zero during the pre-attack period, the ML estimation errors in computing the recovered
state estimates do not accumulate in the pre-attack period.
H. Case 6: Topology Attack/Fault
Except the proposed nonparametric chi-squared test, the proposed methods are prone to the errors in the measurement matrix
H due to either cyber-attacks or faults. This is because Algorithm 1 and the generalized Shewhart test are designed for a given
H (see the hybrid attack model in (5)), whereas the chi-squared test does not depend on attack model assumptions.
On the other hand, the specific version of topology attack/failure in which some rows of H seem zero to the control center
(although they are not) corresponds to DoS attacks, which is covered by the considered hybrid attack model (see Remark 1). For
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Fig. 10: Average detection delay vs. average false alarm period for the proposed detectors and the benchmark tests in case of
a network topology attack/fault.
instance, if the link between two buses in a power grid breaks down due to an attack or fault, then the row in H corresponding
to the power-flow measurement between these buses is changed accordingly such that the corresponding measurement signal
becomes unavailable to the control center. Since the hybrid attack model covers DoS attacks as a special case, such topology
attacks/faults can be detected by the proposed detectors. In Fig. 10, we illustrate the performance of the proposed and the
benchmark algorithms in detecting a line break between buses 9 and 10 in the IEEE-14 bus power system.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the real-time detection of hybrid FDI/jamming attacks in the smart grid. For a given network
topology, we have modeled the smart grid as a linear dynamic system and employed Kalman filters for state estimation. We
have proposed an online CUSUM-based attack detection and estimation algorithm that is robust to unknown and time-varying
attack parameters. We have also presented online estimates of the attack parameters in closed form and recovered state estimates
in case of a cyber-attack. Furthermore, we have introduced and analyzed stealthy attacks against CUSUM-based detectors and
specifically against the proposed algorithm, where the main aim of stealthy attacks is to prevent the detection or at least to
increase the detection delays. We have presented the generalized Shewhart test and the sliding-window chi-squared test as
countermeasures against non-persistent and persistent stealthy attacks, respectively. Through extensive simulations, we have
illustrated that the proposed algorithms can timely and reliably detect hybrid FDI/jamming attacks and stealthy attacks against
CUSUM-based detectors, that correspond to a significantly diverse range of potential cyber-attacks targeting the smart grid.
Moreover, the simulations illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed state recovery mechanism to mitigate the effects of
cyber-attacks on the state estimation mechanism.
The proposed hybrid attack model does not cover network topology attacks as a special case. As a future work, the
generalized state estimation mechanism [44] can be considered where both the system state and the network topology are
estimated based on power flow/injection measurements and measurements regarding the status of network switches and line
breakers, and countermeasures can be developed against advanced topology attacks where attackers simultaneously perform
hybrid FDI/jamming and network topology attacks.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Based on (7) and (8), βt in (16) can be written as follows:
βt =
Kλ
2
log(σ2w) +
1
2σ2w
K∑
k=1
λ∑
i=1
(yk,t,i − hTk xˆ0t )2 + sup
S0t ,Sft ,Sjt ,Sf,jt
{
sup
|ak,t|≥γ, k∈Sft ∪Sf,jt
sup
σ2k,t≥σ2, k∈Sjt ∪Sf,jt{ ∑
k∈S0t
λ∑
i=1
−1
2
log(σ2w)−
1
2σ2w
(yk,t,i − hTk xˆ1t )2 +
∑
k∈Sft
λ∑
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−1
2
log(σ2w)−
1
2σ2w
(yk,t,i − hTk xˆ1t − ak,t)2
+
∑
k∈Sjt
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2
log(σ2w + σ
2
k,t)−
1
2(σ2w + σ
2
k,t)
(yk,t,i − hTk xˆ1t )2
+
∑
k∈Sf,jt
λ∑
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−1
2
log(σ2w + σ
2
k,t)−
1
2(σ2w + σ
2
k,t)
(yk,t,i − hTk xˆ1t − ak,t)2
}}
. (39)
Let ek,t,i , yk,t,i − hTk xˆ1t and ek,t , [ek,t,1, ek,t,2, . . . , ek,t,λ]T. Using the fact that taking supremum of a quantity is
equivalent to taking infimum of the negative of the quantity, (39) can be rewritten as
βt =
Kλ
2
log(σ2w) +
1
2σ2w
K∑
k=1
λ∑
i=1
(yk,t,i − hTk xˆ0t )2 −
1
2
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{ ∑
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.
The MLE estimates of S0t , Sft , Sjt , and Sf,jt are then determined as follows:
Sˆ0t =
{
k : u0(ek,t) ≤ uf (ek,t), u0(ek,t) ≤ uj(ek,t), u0(ek,t) ≤ uf,j(ek,t), k = 1, 2, . . . ,K
}
Sˆft =
{
k : uf (ek,t) < u
0(ek,t), u
f (ek,t) ≤ uj(ek,t), uf (ek,t) ≤ uf,j(ek,t), k = 1, 2, . . . ,K
}
Sˆjt =
{
k : uj(ek,t) < u
0(ek,t), u
j(ek,t) < u
f (ek,t), u
j(ek,t) ≤ uf,j(ek,t), k = 1, 2, . . . ,K
}
Sˆf,jt =
{
k : uf,j(ek,t) < u
0(ek,t), u
f,j(ek,t) < u
f (ek,t), u
f,j(ek,t) < u
j(ek,t), k = 1, 2, . . . ,K
}
.
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Then, βt can be computed as
βt =
Kλ
2
log(σ2w) +
1
2σ2w
K∑
k=1
λ∑
i=1
(yk,t,i − hTk xˆ0t )2
− 1
2
( ∑
k∈Sˆ0t
u0(ek,t) +
∑
k∈Sˆft
uf (ek,t) +
∑
k∈Sˆjt
uj(ek,t) +
∑
k∈Sˆf,jt
uf,j(ek,t)
)
,
where u0(ek,t) is given by (cf. (40))
u0(ek,t) = λ log(σ
2
w) +
∑λ
i=1 e
2
k,t,i
σ2w
.
Next, we determine uf (ek,t), uj(ek,t), uf,j(ek,t), respectively and the MLEs of ak,t and σ2k,t. Firstly,
uf (ek,t) = λ log(σ
2
w) +
inf |ak,t|≥γ
{∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − ak,t)2
}
σ2w
=

λ log(σ2w) +
1
σ2w
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i)
2, if | 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i| ≥ γ
λ log(σ2w) +
1
σ2w
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − γ)2, if 0 ≤ 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < γ
λ log(σ2w) +
1
σ2w
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i + γ)
2, if − γ < 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < 0,
where the MLE of ak,t, k ∈ Sft is obtained as follows:
aˆk,t =

1
λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i, if | 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i| ≥ γ, k ∈ Sft
γ, if 0 ≤ 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < γ, k ∈ Sft
−γ, if − γ < 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < 0, k ∈ Sft .
(41)
Secondly,
uj(ek,t) = inf
σ2k,t≥σ2
{
λ log(σ2w + σ
2
k,t) +
∑λ
i=1 e
2
k,t,i
σ2w + σ
2
k,t
}
.
We have ∂u
j(ek,t)
∂σ2k,t
= λ
σ2w+σ
2
k,t
−
∑λ
i=1 e
2
k,t,i
(σ2w+σ
2
k,t)
2 = 0 if σ2k,t = −σ2w + 1λ
∑λ
i=1 e
2
k,t,i. Moreover, for σ
2
k,t < −σ2w + 1λ
∑λ
i=1 e
2
k,t,i,
∂uj(ek,t)
∂σ2k,t
< 0 and for σ2k,t > −σ2w + 1λ
∑λ
i=1 e
2
k,t,i,
∂uj(ek,t)
∂σ2k,t
> 0. Hence, if 1λ
∑λ
i=1 e
2
k,t,i ≥ σ2w + σ2, uj(ek,t) takes it
minimum at σ2k,t = −σ2w + 1λ
∑λ
i=1 e
2
k,t,i. On the other hand, if
1
λ
∑λ
i=1 e
2
k,t,i < σ
2
w + σ
2, uj(ek,t) is monotone increasing
function of σ2k,t in the range of σ
2
k,t ≥ σ2. Hence, uj(ek,t) takes its minimum at σ2k,t = σ2. Then,
uj(ek,t) =

λ log( 1λ
∑λ
i=1 e
2
k,t,i) + λ, if
1
λ
∑λ
i=1 e
2
k,t,i ≥ σ2w + σ2
λ log(σ2w + σ
2) + 1σ2w+σ2
∑λ
i=1 e
2
k,t,i, if
1
λ
∑λ
i=1 e
2
k,t,i < σ
2
w + σ
2,
where the MLE of σ2k,t, k ∈ Sjt is obtained as follows:
σˆ2k,t =

−σ2w + 1λ
∑λ
i=1 e
2
k,t,i, if
1
λ
∑λ
i=1 e
2
k,t,i ≥ σ2w + σ2, k ∈ Sjt
σ2, if 1λ
∑λ
i=1 e
2
k,t,i < σ
2
w + σ
2, k ∈ Sjt .
(42)
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Further,
uf,j(ek,t) = inf
σ2k,t≥σ2
inf
|ak,t|≥γ
{
λ log(σ2w + σ
2
k,t) +
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − ak,t)2
(σ2w + σ
2
k,t)
}
= inf
σ2k,t≥σ2
{
λ log(σ2w + σ
2
k,t) +
inf |ak,t|≥γ
{∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − ak,t)2
}
(σ2w + σ
2
k,t)
}
=

infσ2k,t≥σ2
{
λ log(σ2w + σ
2
k,t) +
1
(σ2w+σ
2
k,t)
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i)
2
}
, if | 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i| ≥ γ
infσ2k,t≥σ2
{
λ log(σ2w + σ
2
k,t) +
1
(σ2w+σ
2
k,t)
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − γ)2
}
, if 0 ≤ 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < γ
infσ2k,t≥σ2
{
λ log(σ2w + σ
2
k,t) +
1
(σ2w+σ
2
k,t)
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i + γ)
2
}
, if − γ < 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < 0
=

λ log( 1λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i)
2) + λ, if | 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i| ≥ γ and 1λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i)
2 ≥ σ2w + σ2
λ log(σ2w + σ
2) + 1σ2w+σ2
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i)
2, if | 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i| ≥ γ and 1λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i)
2 < σ2w + σ
2
λ log( 1λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − γ)2) + λ, if 0 ≤ 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < γ and
1
λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − γ)2 ≥ σ2w + σ2
λ log(σ2w + σ
2) + 1σ2w+σ2
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − γ)2, if 0 ≤ 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < γ and
1
λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − γ)2 < σ2w + σ2
λ log( 1λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i + γ)
2) + λ, if − γ < 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < 0 and
1
λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i + γ)
2 ≥ σ2w + σ2
λ log(σ2w + σ
2) + 1σ2w+σ2
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i + γ)
2, if − γ < 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < 0 and
1
λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i + γ)
2 < σ2w + σ
2,
where the MLE of ak,t, k ∈ Sf,jt is obtained as
aˆk,t =

1
λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i, if | 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i| ≥ γ, k ∈ Sf,jt
γ, if 0 ≤ 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < γ, k ∈ Sf,jt
−γ, if − γ < 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < 0, k ∈ Sf,jt ,
(43)
and the MLE of σ2k,t, k ∈ Sf,jt is obtained as follows:
σˆ2k,t =

−σ2w + 1λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i)
2, if | 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i| ≥ γ and 1λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i)
2 ≥ σ2w + σ2
σ2, if | 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i| ≥ γ and 1λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i)
2 < σ2w + σ
2
−σ2w + 1λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − γ)2, if 0 ≤ 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < γ and
1
λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − γ)2 ≥ σ2w + σ2
σ2, if 0 ≤ 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < γ and
1
λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − γ)2 < σ2w + σ2
−σ2w + 1λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i + γ)
2, if − γ < 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < 0 and
1
λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i + γ)
2 ≥ σ2w + σ2
σ2, if − γ < 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < 0 and
1
λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i + γ)
2 < σ2w + σ
2.
(44)
31
Using (41), (43), and the MLEs of S0t , Sft , Sjt , and Sf,jt , the MLE of ak,t, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} is then determined as follows:
aˆk,t =

1
λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i, if | 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i| ≥ γ and k ∈ Sˆft ∪ Sˆf,jt
γ, if 0 ≤ 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < γ and k ∈ Sˆft ∪ Sˆf,jt
−γ, if − γ < 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < 0 and k ∈ Sˆft ∪ Sˆf,jt
0, if k ∈ Sˆ0t ∪ Sˆjt .
Furthermore, using (42), (44), and the MLEs of S0t , Sft , Sjt , and Sf,jt , the MLE of σ2k,t, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} is obtained as
follows:
σˆ2k,t =
−σ2w + 1λ
∑λ
i=1 e
2
k,t,i, if
1
λ
∑λ
i=1 e
2
k,t,i ≥ σ2w + σ2 and k ∈ Sˆjt
σ2, if 1λ
∑λ
i=1 e
2
k,t,i < σ
2
w + σ
2 and k ∈ Sˆjt
−σ2w + 1λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i)
2, if | 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i| ≥ γ and 1λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i)
2 ≥ σ2w + σ2 and k ∈ Sˆf,jt
σ2, if | 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i| ≥ γ and 1λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i)
2 < σ2w + σ
2 and k ∈ Sˆf,jt
−σ2w + 1λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − γ)2, if 0 ≤ 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < γ and
1
λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − γ)2 ≥ σ2w + σ2 and k ∈ Sˆf,jt
σ2, if 0 ≤ 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < γ and
1
λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − γ)2 < σ2w + σ2 and k ∈ Sˆf,jt
−σ2w + 1λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i + γ)
2, if − γ < 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < 0 and
1
λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i + γ)
2 ≥ σ2w + σ2 and k ∈ Sˆf,jt
σ2, if − γ < 1λ
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i < 0 and
1
λ
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i + γ)
2 < σ2w + σ
2 and k ∈ Sˆf,jt
0, if k ∈ Sˆ0t ∪ Sˆft .
Finally, defining δk,t ,
∑λ
i=1 ek,t,i, ζk,t ,
∑λ
i=1 e
2
k,t,i, %k,t ,
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i + γ)
2, and $k,t ,
∑λ
i=1(ek,t,i − γ)2, ∀k ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,K} and ∀t > 0, we obtain the simplified expressions as given in Proposition 1.
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